Toward Spatial Reasoning about "Natural" Objects

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Abstract

Until now, most of works about Spatial Reasoning focused on artificial objects. This paper addresses Spatial Reasoning in the game of Go that is a domain where the objects look like "natural". Two criterias toward a definition of "natural" objects is proposed : fractal structure of objects and dependency between genesis and use of objects. Combinatorial complexity of the game of Go obliges the Computer Go community to study spatial representations of human players that are complex. These representations contain the concepts of grouping and fractioning. Spatial Reasoning in Go is qualitative. It creates objects and relationships between them. Our work is linked with mereotopology and Geographical Information Systems. We assume that studies about Spatial Reasoning in Go is a path toward a general theory of Spatial Reasoning about natural objects.

Keywords :

Spatial Reasoning, Objects, Natural versus Artificial, Relationships, Game of Go

Abstract

Jusqu'à maintenant, la plupart des travaux en Raisonnement Spatial s'intéressent aux raisonnements sur des objets artificiels. Le sujet de ce rapport est le Raisonnement Spatial au jeu de Go où les objets ont une apparence "naturelle". Deux caractéristiques du "naturel" des objets sont avancées : d'une part la structure fractale des objets et d'autre part la dépendance entre la genèse et l'utilisation des objets. La complexité combinatoire au jeu de Go oblige les programmeurs de Go à étudier les représentations spatiales des joueurs humains. Ces représentations sont complexes et contiennent les concepts de regroupement et de division. Le Raisonnement Spatial au jeu de Go est qualitatif. Il crée des objets et les relations entre eux. Notre travail se rapproche des travaux en méréotopologie et des Systemes d'Informations Géographiques. Nous pensons que les études menées sur le Raisonnement Spatial au Go mènera vers une théorie plus générale du Raisonnement Spatial sur des objets naturels.

Mot-clés :

Raisonnement Spatial, Naturel et Artificiel, Objets, Relations, jeu de Go

1. Introduction

The structure of natural landscapes strongly differs from artificial ones. A first intuitive difference is regularity. Mountains, lakes and coasts are irregular but buildings, wheels, tables, and beds are regular. Many works in Spatial Reasoning (SR) are dealing with artificial objects. We now want to put the light on natural objects. Given the complexity of the real world, the main obstacle in studying natural objects is the complexity of experiments to be performed. Thus, special domains that simplify the real world while keeping its "natural" features are welcome.

The purpose of the paper is to show SR in a special domain where objects are "natural" : the game of Go. The paper is structured as follows :

Part 2 addresses the natural-artificial paradigm. Part 2.1 proposes criterias toward a prospective general definition of "natural" objects. Part 2.2 shows that the SR community must study SR in domains containing "natural" objects.

Part 3 introduces the game of Go. Part 3.1 shows why the game of Go is well-suited to study SR about "natural" objects. Part 3.2 shows that beyond the first obstacle of combinatorial complexity, the main obstacle in Computer Go is *spatial* evaluation of positions.

Part 4 shows the SR model of Go. Part 4.1 shows the creation of relevant objects in Go positions and part 4.2 shows the SR about these objects using relationships between them.

Before conclusion, part 5 gives practical results of the full Go playing program INDIGO [Bouzy 1995b] that implements the model [Bouzy 1995]. Then, it shows the links with other works inside the SR community. It shows that this model is a good example towards SR about "natural" objects.

2. Natural versus Artificial

This part addresses two questions :

Which criterias are pertinent to define "natural" objects ?

Do related works in SR deal more with artificial or "natural" objects ?

2.1 Pertinent criterias toward a definition of "natural" objects.

Connexity or what is an object ?

Connexity is a well-known topological property of objects. The human perceptive system groups everything it can group. This is one of the most famous result of Gestalt theory [Kohler 1965]. We assume that *objects are connex*, at least on the human scale.

Fractal dimension, fractal objects, scaling objects

In Nature, one commonly says that a river has dimension 1, a lake dimension 2 and a mountain dimension 3. Such an affirmation refers to Topological Dimension (TD). But fractal theory [Mandelbrot 1982], defining the Fractal Dimension (FD), has shown that such objects as rivers, lakes and mountains get non integer FD [Lovejoy 1982] [Mandelbrot 1967]. This theory shows also that, if FD of an object is an integer, then FD=TD. So, FD is more general than TD. *Objects whose FD is not an integer are said to be "fractal".*

In practice, FD can be approximated with the use of dimensional formulas [Mandelbrot 1982]. Many natural objects in Nature are fractal. So, we assume that *the fractal dimension of an object is a good criteria to state wether an object is "natural".*

The idea that an object is fractal if it is identical at different scales *is false*. This scaling property defines a more specialized class of objects that are said to be "scaling" objects. Of course, scaling objects are fractal. Natural objects cannot be "scaling" because the shape of a river has nothing to do with the shape of atoms. In order to model the nature, the fractal property is sounder than the scaling property.

Genesis and use of objects

Artificial objects are built by human beings : buildings, computers, tables, beds, etc. They are often made up of parts that are block-like. Artificial objects'genesis is separated from its use : first, a hammer is built by the man, then the man uses it.

Natural objects are built by chaotic processes that depend on their environment. Most natural objects do not make a distinction between their growth and their use [Thomson 1917]. Their use and their genesis is seen as a unique process. We assume that *a measure of the dependency of the genesis and the use of an object is a second good criteria to affirm wether an object is "natural".*

2.2 SR through the Natural-Artificial paradigm.

This paragraph lists some classical domains in SR and analyzes if they deal with *natural* or *artificial* objects.

Applications

Route Finding (RF) or Route Description (RD) applications [Kuipers 1978] [Fraczak 1995] deal with towns or cities whose parts (buildings, roads) are mostly *artificial*. Located objects in locations applications [Fuhr & al. 1995] are often *artificial*.

Geographical Information Systems (GIS)

GIS are processing both *natural* and *artificial* objects. In order to specify spatial query languages [Egenhorfer 1994], many works deal with topological relationships between objects. Calculus-Based Methods (CBM) [Clementini & De Felice 1995] expresses topological operators or properties. These works are very useful in the scope of a general theory of *natural* objects.

Computational Models (CM)

General CM are often level-oriented. In the famous model of vision [Marr 1982], there are 3 levels : primal sketch, 2D level, "2D1/2" level. In GIS again, several levels exist [McMaster & Barnet 1993]. These multi-level models aim to deal with both *natural* and *artificial* objects.

Temporal Logics (TL) and SR

[Allen 1982] describes an algebra on intervals (one-dimensional objects). It inspired many researchers in SR who wanted to find some algebras on n-dimensional objects that are expressed as n-uples of intervals. It can succeed on *artificial* objects in RF applications [Mukerjee & Joe 1990].

Linguistics

Given that Natural Language (NL) addresses the whole world, linguistics addresses both *artificial* and *natural* objects [Herskovits 1986] [Aurnague & Vieu 1995].

The following table summarizes this paragraph :

	Applications	GIS	CM	TL-inspired	NL
Natural		x	x		x
Artificial	x	x	x	x	x

It shows that works in SR must now focus on natural objects instead of artificial ones.

3. The game of Go

This paragraph shows that the game of Go fits the previous criterias and that Computer Go needs good spatial representation.

3.1 Computer Go is a positive contribution to SR about natural objects :

Connexity

We will see in part 4.1 that the rules of the game of Go use the concept of "string" that contains the connexity property. In part 4.2, we will see that "groups" and "fractions" are connex objects. Then, in part 4.3. we will see that SR operates "fusions" with "groups" that stay connex. So the game of Go is a game of connexity.

Fractal dimension

In Go, classical objects as stone, string and territory can be seen as non fractal : a stone can be seen as a point (TD=0), a string of stones as a line (TD=1) and a territory as a surface (TD=2). But some experiments [Yang & Yao 1991] has shown that some Go objects (i.e. "groups" of part 4.2) are fractal with FDÅ1.82. So, Go is a good domain in order to study SR about fractal objects. Conversely, Chess does not satisfy this criteria as the shape of objects does not matter with the game itself.

Genesis and Use

Complexity of the whole game implies that human players manage sub-goals instead of the main goal which is to win the game. One move in the game of Go is played in order to reach a sub-goal about one given object (*use*). This move modifies or creates the object itself (*genesis*). So, Go is a good domain again in order to study SR where genesis and use of objects are dependent. Conversely, Chess does not satisfy this criteria because the genesis of an object (a Bishop for instance) in Chess is defined by the rules of the game and the use of an object (moving through a diagonal for instance) does not modify it.

3.2 Computer Go needs powerful SR about natural objects.

[Allis 1994] defines combinatorial complexities of games as follow : E is the number of possible positions in Go and A is the whole game tree complexity. Considering the average length of actual games L and average branching factor B, we get $A = B^{L}$. Literature on games and Human (H) versus Computer (C) results give the following table :

	Othello	Chess	Go[1]
E	3^{64} Å 10^{30}	10^{43}	3^{361} Å 10^{172}
A	10^{58}	35^{80} Å 10^{67}	200^{250} Å 10^{575}
Hum. v.Comput.	H<C	HÅC	H>>C

These games get increasing complexity and seem to be correlated with Human versus Computer results. "Brute force" succeeds in Othello and Chess but not in Go. Therefore, Go is one of the most exciting challenge for AI [Bradley 1979]. The best Go program is Goliath [Boon 1991]. Our Go playing program is INDIGO [Bouzy 1995b].

This previous combinatorial reasoning is approximative because one could argue that 7x7 Go is as complex as Othello. That is wrong : 7x7 Computer Go results are still very weak on the human scale while best Othello programs are much better than best human players. So, the complexity of Go is not due to the sisze of the board. One suppose that *the complexity of Go is due to the spatial properties of Go positions. Computer Go needs powerful theories about Spatial Reasoning*.

Human Go players are much stronger than the computer. The human skill in Go is mainly due to the intuitive knowledge about space. Therefore, Go programmers must observe human Go players and mimic them. In this meaning, Go computational models are cognitive models. Experiments that have been done on Chess [Chase & Simon 1973] have been done again on Go [Reitman 1976]. The results are similar : experts use "chunks" that allow to overpass novice abilities on actual positions but not on random positions. In our thesis [Bouzy 1995], we elaborated a cognitive model in order to uncover intuitive knowledge about real world. We studied in particular grouping, fractioning, closure, cercling and incrementality.

4. Spatial Representation and Spatial Reasoning in Go

This part shows SR in the full Go playing program INDIGO. This program was the implementation of a cognitive model of Go players. This part uses a mathematical formalism and it is illustrated by examples. Figure 1 shows the start position.

[1]In average, a 19x19 game lasts 250 moves and there are 200 possible moves. Of course, this is wrong in the beginning and at the end of the game but true in average.



figure 1

4.1 Rules of the game

In this paragraph, we show only the parts of the rules of the game of Go, that are necessary to understand parts 4.2 and 4.3.

Board and intersections

The game is played on a board that contains intersections of N vertical lines with N horizontal lines. Usually N=19. Let *B* be the set of intersections. Each intersection *i* has two coordinates. Let *x(i)* be the horizontal coordinate and *y(i)* be the vertical coordinate.

Neighborhood of an intersection

Each intersection *i* in *B* gets neighbours. Let *up* be the function defined as follows : *j=up(i)* is defined for *y(i)<N* with $x(j) = x(i)$, $y(j) = y(i)+1$. One can define three others functions *right*, *down* and *left* on the same template. $V(i) = \{up(i), down(i), left(i), right(i)\}$ is the neighborhood of the intersection i.

Stones

Each player can put a stone on an intersection. Let *color* be the function defining th color of an intersection as follows : $color(i) \in \{empty, black, white\}$. We define the *Empty* set as follows : $Empty = \{i \in B | color(i) = empty\}$. We define the *Black* and *White* sets on the same template.

Connections and strings

The rules of the game define an actual connection between to adjacent intersections of the same color : if $i \in V(j) \quad and \quad color(i) = color(j)$ then i and j belong to the same *string*. The rules of the game define the black (resp. white) strings of the board B as the connex composants of the sets *Black* (resp. *White*). Let SS_C be the set of the strings of color *c*. Let *SS* be the set of strings. Let $S_c = \{i \in B | \exists s \in SS_c : i \in s\}$ be the set of intersections that belong to a string of color c. We get : $S_{black} = Black \quad and \quad S_{white} = White$.

Liberties

Each string *s* has a set of liberties *liberties(s)* that is defined with : $liberties(s) = dilate(s) \cap Empty$. The *dilate* operator of mathematical morphology [Serra 1982] is defined with : $dilate(x) = \{i \in B | \exists j \in x : i \in V(j)\}$. The *erase* operator is defined with : $erase(x) = \{i \in B | \forall j \notin x : i \notin V(j)\}$. We get : $erase(x) = \neg dilate(\neg x)$ where $\neg x = \{i \in B | i \notin x\}$.

Actions on the board

Each player can put a stone of his color on an empty intersection. The "capture" rule tells that if putting a stone suppresses the last liberty of the string s, the string s is removed from the board.

Aim of the game

The aim of the game is to "control" more intersections than the opponent does. Control of an intersection can be explicit, with a stone on it, or it can be implicit, supposing that the opponent cannot put a stone on it without being captured. *Game of Go is a race to fill the space. Therefore SR is crucial in Go.*

4.2 Spatial representations of the human player

This paragraph adresses SR at the human player level. SR of the human Go player has two levels : an "elementary" level where elementary objects are recognized with direct pattern-matching and an "iterative" level where complex objects are recognized through a complex SR.

Elementary level

This level is a collection of patterns that are useful to build objects of the iterative level.

Pattern

A pattern is a "small" (<25) connex set of intersections. A pattern gets friend intersections, opponent intersections and empty intersections. A pattern has a color which is the color of the friend intersections. A pattern has a state. According to the spatial locations of the friend, opponent and empty intersections the state of the pattern can be : Positive, Negative or Fuzzy. A pattern has one or several types : *connection*, *divider* or *contact*. The computational model contains a pattern database. At run-time, a pattern-matching algorithm detects actual patterns that are present on the board.

Connections and dividers

Let $CC_C(S)$ be the set of connections of color c whose state is S. Let $DD_C(S)$ be the set of dividers of color c whose state is S. Figure 2 shows six patterns that are both connections and dividers in different states.



figure 2

Contacts

Let CT be the set of contacts. Figure 3 shows patterns that are elementary contacts.



figure 3

These patterns are used in the next level to build iterative objects.

Iterative level

The iterative level is a collection of objects that are built iteratively using patterns of the elementary level. Iterative objects are "groups" and "fractions".

Iterative objects

An iterative object is a connex set of intersections that is constructed iteratively. One iteration of the construction depends on the type of the objects. Iterations stop when the object is the same after one more iteration. An iterative object has a color.

Groups

At the beginning, the groups of a given color are initialized with the strings of this color. Then iterations are performed until they do not change the set of groups.

One iteration

Let g be the group in construction. Let *CC(g)* be the set of connections of the same color as g whose state is Positive. We get : $CC(g) = \left\{ cc \in CC_{color(g)}(Positive) \middle| cc \bigcap g \neq \varnothing \right\}$. We define *N(g)* as the positive friend neighborhood of g as follows : $N(g) = \left\{ h \in GG_{color(g)} \middle| h \neq g \quad and \quad h \bigcap CC(g) \neq \varnothing \right\}$. After one iteration, g is replaced with g and the groups that belong to *N(g)*. We write : $g \rightarrow g \bigcup_{h \in N(g)} h$

Notations

Let GGc be the set of groups of color c staying on the board. Let G_C be the set of intersections where there is a group of color c. We get : $G_c = \left\{ i \in B \middle| \exists g \in GG_c : i \in g \right\}$.

Figure 4 shows the groups that correspond to figure 1.



figure 4

Fractions

Let F_C be the set of the intersections that are not in a divider. We get : $F_c = \left\{ i \in B \middle| \forall d \in DD_c(Positive) : i \notin d \right\}$. Let FF_C be the set of the connex composants of F_C. Let us call an element f of FF_C a *fraction* of color c.

Conclusion

We defined groups, and fractions in a constructive way. To build these objects we used

operators of the set theory : $\cup$ and $\cap$,

topological properties of connection and division.

4.3 Spatial reasoning or how to qualify groups

Aim of SR in Go

The aim of spatial reasoning in Go is to give an evaluation *E(B)* of the board B. It sums the contributions *C(x)* of each group of the board :

$$E(B) = \sum_{x \in GG} C(x) sign(x)$$

Each contribution *C(x)* of a group x is defined as follows : $C(x) = \begin{cases} 0 & if \quad O(x) = Fuzzy \\ size(x) & if \quad O(x) = Positive \end{cases}$ and $sign(x) = \begin{cases} +1 & if \quad color(x) = Black \\ -1 & if \quad color(x) = White \end{cases}$

O(x) is defined below.

SR is a loop of iterations.

One iteration

During one iteration *opponentship O(x)* of all groups x are computed. O(x) gathers information about the relationships between the group x and its opponent neighbours. To compute *O(x)* of a group x, our system computes *cercling* - or *emptyship* - *E(x)* before. E(x) gathers information about the relationship between the group x and the fraction in which x stays.

Emptyship or Cercling of a group

Each group of a given color is included in a fraction of the opposite color. Conversely, a fraction of a given color contains zero, one or several groups of the opposite color. Let us define the *cercling distance* of a group as the smallest number N such as : $\Delta^{N+1}(g) = \Delta^{N}(g)$ with $\Delta(g) = dilate(g) \cap F_{\neg color(g)}$. We can fix a threshold T such as N<T means that g is *cercled* and that g is not cercled in the converse case.

Let *z = fraction(x)* be the fraction containing x and N the cercling distance of x by z. We define Cercling or Emptyship *E(x)* as follows :

$$E(x) = \begin{cases} Negative & if \quad N < 2 \\ Fuzzy & if \quad N = 2 \\ Positive & if \quad N > 2 \end{cases}$$

Figure 5 shows Emptyship of each group on the board. E means emptyship. > means Positive and < means Negative.



figure 5

Opponentship of a group

Let us define the opponent neighborhood of a group x as the set that is defined as follows :
$opponent-neighborhood(x)=\{y\in GG_{\neg color(x)} | \exists c\in CT: c\cap x\neq\emptyset \quad and \quad c\cap y\neq\emptyset\}$

Given two opponent groups x and y, we define a relationship *R(x,y)* that tells which group from x and y is the stronger one. *R(x,y)* depends of values *E(x)*, *E(y)*.

To compute R(x,y), we use the following rules :

$(\exists\alpha\in\{x,y\}: E(\alpha)=Fuzzy)\Rightarrow(R(x,y)=Fuzzy)$

$(E(x)=Negative<E(y)=Positive)\Rightarrow((R(x,y)=Negative)\wedge(R(y,x)=Positive))$

$(E(x)=E(y)=Positive)\Rightarrow(R(x,y)=Fuzzy)$

$(E(x)=E(y)=Negative)\Rightarrow(R(x,y)=Fuzzy)$

Figure 6 shows the relationships between adjacent groups.



figure 6

If all relationships *R(x,y)* are Negative, then opponentship is also Negative :

$(\forall y\in opponent-neighborhood(x): R(x,y)=Negative)\Rightarrow O(x)=Negative$

If one interaction with its opponents is Fuzzy, then opponentship is also Fuzzy :

$(\exists y\in opponent-neighborhood(x): R(x,y)=Fuzzy)\Rightarrow O(x)=Fuzzy$

Figure 7 shows opponentship of each group on the board. > means Positive, * means Fuzzy and < means Negative.



figure 7

The fusion operator

Classical closure operator of mathematical morphology [Serra 1982] applies on objects with only one color. We use a generalization of this operator that manages objects with two colors and that smoothes the groups at a fixed scale. This generalization is described in [Bouzy 1995]. Let us call it *closure*. Then we define the $\bigcup_*$ operator as a generalization of the $\bigcup$ operator. Let A and B be two closed sets, we get : $A \bigcup_* B = closure\left(A \bigcup B\right)$.

Death of a group

When a group x gets *O(x)=Negative*, Go players say "the group is dead". Conceptually, a new group Y is created by fusion of the opponent groups around the group x :

$$Y = x \cup_* \bigcup^{*}_{y \in opponent-neighborhood(x)} y$$

When *Y* is created, the set *G* of all the groups on the board also changed. A new iteration starts again on G. Figure 8 shows the new set of groups.



figure 8

The group x is *in* the group Y. Objects that are built by SR can be composed of sub-objects.

End

SR ends when no group with Negative opponentship is detected. Then, *E(B)* is computed.

5. Implementation, results and discussion.

5.1. Implementation - Results in practice.

The Go playing software INDIGO is an implementation of this model with C++ code and specific diagrammatic language (500 rules). INDIGO is ranked 4th upon 7 on the 19x19 Computer Go Ladder [Pettersen 1994] and 8th upon 11 on the 9x9 ladder. It has been developped in two years between fall of 1991 and spring 1994 in connection with the cognitive model that we built.

5.2. Discussion

In this paragraph, we link SR in Go with other fields of the SR community in order to initiate an interdisciplinary dialogue.

Mereology

Our work is an illustration of mereology [Lesniewski 1927-31]. First, our system deals much with *part-of* relationships. An intersection is part of a string, that is part of a group. The whole board is composed with fractions. Second, we defined two fusion operators : $\cup$ and $\cup^*$ that are very useful to build objects.

Using terminology about contacts described in [Aurnague & Vieu 1995], we see that the new object z that is created with the *fusion* operator using the dead group x and the opponents groups y, is composed of sub-objects that are parts of it. The contacts between the dead group x and the opponent groups y are *weak* before the fusion but become a *strong contact* after it. In the general case, the contacts between opponent groups whose states are not Negative can be seen as a *weak contacts.*

Qualitative reasoning and quantitative reasoning in Go

The part of SR that is presented in this paper is qualitative. But another part of SR in Go is quantitative. At the move decision level, succeeding to reach a goal on an object of size N gives a value of N times the value of succeeding to reach a goal on an object of size 1.

Propositional versus diagrammatic reasoning

In our model, SR uses diagrammatic formalism (see patterns of the elementary level) or propositional formalism (see the iterative level).

Connection between SR in Go and NL

Our system builds a semantic net. It would not be difficult to make our system explaining in NL its way of playing. It would be an illustration of the new topic of integration of NL and vision. The main prepositions that are used in comments in Go are : 'up', 'down', 'left', 'right', 'middle', 'edge', 'corner', 'in', 'touch', 'cercled'. This will be the subject of another paper.

GIS

The CBM [Clementini & De Felice 1995] uses five operators. Let us see which one are used in our work.

touch operator : yes (*contacts* of mereology).
in operator : yes (after a *fusion* operation, a group is *in* another one).
cross operator : yes (a group is crossing the fraction of opposite color that contains it).
overlap operator : yes (two fractions of opposite color are *overlapping* each other).
disjoint operator : yes (two different groups).
boundary for an area : yes (the *dilation - identity* operator).
boundary for a line : no (distinction between line and area is not useful in Go).

So most of operators of CBM are sound for our Go model.

In our model, the following operators are also useful : the *closure* operator and the *cercling* operator. Perhaps, they could be also useful in GIS.

CM

Our model is structured in levels as general CM are. In this paper, we focused only on the "iterative object" level. Other levels are described in [Bouzy 1995]. Our "iterative object" level corresponds to "conceptual spatial object level" in [McMaster & Barnet 1993] and to "geometrical level" in [Aurnague & Vieu 1995].

Must we focus on topological dimension ?

We think that SR focuses much on topological dimension of objects. Each work in SR situates itself in one of the three categories : one-dimensional [Allen 1983], two-dimensional [Kuipers 1978] [Egenhofer 1994] [Clementini & De Felice 1995], three-dimensional [Fuhr & al. 1995] or n-dimensional [Mukerjee & Joe 1990]. We think that SR must give more importance to natural objects whose FD is not integer. The path was open by [Mandelbrot 1967]. The SR community must elaborate spatial computational and cognitive models where non-integer dimensions exist. The game of Go, with objects whose FD can be non integer, is a good example of domain in which studies must be continued.

6. Conclusion

In this paper, we proposed two qualitative criterias allowing to define if an object is natural or not. These two criterias are the fractal dimension of the object and an interdependancy measure between use and genesis of the object. Then, we showed that related work in SR deals much more with artificial objects than with natural ones. In search of a domain where experiments are practically feasible and where Spatial Reasoning exists about natural objects, we found the special domain of Go. Complexity of this game is high enough to forbid combinatorial approach and actual results between the man and the computer oblige to study human SR.

Our work about Go was presented in a mathematical formalism. We defined natural objects that are familiar to our intuition : groups and fractions. We used operators such as fusion ($\cup *$), overlap, touch, in, proximity, cercling, closure that we linked with other works [Clementini & De Felice 1995] [Aurnague & Vieu 1995].

We think that SR focuses too much on topological dimension of objects, and therefore on artificial objects. Light must be shed on domains where natural objects are present, such as the Go domain. Mathematical works of precursors [Thomson 1917] [Mandelbrot 1982] about nature, invit us to study SR about natural objects.

7. Bibliography

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